220
would have joined the mob, with incalculable
consequences,
Referring to the view of the Chiefs
of Staff, that Japan was the only country which could act in time to ensure the safety of Shanghai
against an attack by the Chinese Nationalist forces
(if the latter should undertake it), the Secretary of
State pointed out that up to now such indications as
he had of the attitude of the Japanese Government
went to show that they were disinclined to take the
lead in any way in China, and were perhaps not ill-
pleased at seeing the boycott, from which they then-
selves had suffered in the past, transferred to the
British. He read telegram No.7. from Tokyo, dated
January 11th, indicating a possible change of
attitude. The Japanese General Staff, but without the
knowledge of the Tokyo Foreign office, was reported
as anxious to enter into military conversations with
the British General Staff with a view to concerting
plans for the defence of Shanghai. This would enable
him to instruct the Ambassador at Tokyo to ascertain
whether the Foreign Minister shared the view of the
Japanese General Staff, and, in the event of an
affirmative reply, the two Staffs could be put in
contact.
Sir Austen Chamberlain then read telegram No.14
from Hankow, indicating that the Japanese Consul-
General was working with us there, but that the United
States representatives, probably under instructions
from Washington, had become aloof; also a telegram
(No.15) reporting the evacuation of women and children
from Chang-sha and Chung-King. He made it clear that
Mr. O'Malley's mission to Hankow (where he had arrived
on the previous day) had the object of ascertaining
the
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